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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE: ROMANIA,
HUNGARY, AND YUGOSLAVIA
In April 1973 Control Data Corporation announced it had entered into
a joint venture agreement1 to manufacture its products in Romania,2
thereby becoming the first American business to engage in joint venture
production in that country. Two years earlier, such an arrangement
would not have been possible. Prior to 1971, Romanian law conformed
to the orthodox socialist doctrine which vests ownership of the means
of production in the state, a position which does not, strictly speaking,
permit foreign equity participation in economic organizations. In the
interim, however, several developments had occurred in Romanian law
favorable to Western investors.
The Control Data announcement represents the second recent8 instance
of an Eastern European nation4 disregarding socialist doctrine and suc-
1. For purposes of this Note, a "joint venture" means an overseas operation in
which, by virtue of its investment of money and/or capital goods and technology, a
foreign investor has something akin to an equity interest, i.e., it has an element of
control over the venture and shares the risks and rewards. It is to be distinguished
from other, more limited cooperative forms of investment such as the extension of
long-term credits, franchising, licensing, coproduction schemes, and the sale of turnkey
factories.
For discussions of these various forms of investment agreements, see R-. KRzrscmrAR
R . FooR, THE POTENTIAL FOR JoINT VENTURES IN EAsTERN EuRoPE 3-13, 71-72 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as KYTscA & FooR]; Note, American Private Direct Investment
in Eastern Europe: Intersection of Business Interests and Foreign Policy, 21 STAN. L.
RnV. 877, 888-97 (1969) [hereinafter cited as American Direct Investment]. For an
interesting discussion of how the essential benefits of joint venture participation
might be obtained through one of the other forms, see Benoit, The Joint Venture
Route to East-West Investment, Awr. REv. EAst-W=sr TRADE, June 1968, at 39, 40-42.
2. The venture will manufacture peripheral computer components. For details
of the agreement concluded with the Romanian Ministry of Machine Tools and
Electro Techniques, see Morse 9- Goekjian, Joint Investment Opportunities with
the Socialist Republic of Romania, 29 Bus. LAw. 133, 144-46 (1973).
3. The phenomenon of foreign businesses investing capital in the economies of
socialist states is not entirely without precedent. During the years of the Soviet
Union's New Economic Policy (NEP), 1921-1928, substantial amounts of foreign capital
were injected into the war-ravaged Soviet economy. For discussions of the NEP, see
M. Doaa, SovEr ECONOMic DEVELOPmEms SINCEF 1917, at 125-207 (rev. ed. 1966); A.
MAZOUR, Soviar EcoNomic DEELOPmENT: OPRTION OUtsnuv, 1921-1965, at 21-33
(1967).
4. For the purposes of this Note, Eastern Europe consists of Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. It should
be observed, however, that Yugoslavia is often excluded from this group by the
United States government because of its long-standing independence from the Soviet
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cessfully attracting direct investment from the capitalist world; Yugosla-
via's foreign investment law underwent similar changes as early as 1967
and has since attracted substantial foreign investment.5 Moreover, in late
1972, Hungary amended its laws to permit foreign equity participation
in joint ventures, though to date none has been forthcoming, and it ap-
pears several other Eastern European countries may also do so.6
Because legal developments in Romania and Hungary generally fol-
lowed the earlier changes in Yugoslav law and were generated with
similar considerations in mind, this Note proposes to compare the three
investment -laws and assess their relative appeal to foreign investors. The
basic premise underlying this analysis is that future investment choices
by American businesses among competing Eastern European markets will
turn upon advantages one country offers over its competitors by virtue
of a more favorable investment law. Because American investors must
also observe domestic law affecting overseas operations, some attention
will be paid to the degree to which American laws treat commercial rela-
tions with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary differently.
A legally oriented approach must inevitably ignore the multitude of
economic factors bearing upon investment choices. Nevertheless, it is
helpful at the'outset to examine the general background of the legal
frameworks for foreign investment existing in Yugoslavia, Romania, and
Hungary in order to gain an understanding of the interaction of eco-
nomic forces which led to them.
I
FORCES PUSHING TOWARDS A NEW INVESTMENT TECHNIQUE
As Cold War tensions began to subside in the mid-1960's and the period
of East-West detente set in, American businesses became aware of the vast
potential which the markets of Eastern Europe held for American goods
Union's influence within the region. For an example of this treatment of Yugoslavia,
see notes 76-90 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 23 infra.
6. Poland also appears willing to enter into joint ventures with the West, but
wishes to do so on an ad hoc basis rather than establish a legal framework that
would regularize such transactions. Webster & Stowell, Foreword to Kmrsc-MAR &
FooR, supra note 1, at x. Czechoslovakia, which currently allows no joint ventures,
is also considering changes in its laws that would be favorable to such foreign invest-
ment. Letter from F. Rousek, Third Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy to the
United States, to author, Sept. 13, 1973, on file at the offices of the Cornell International
Law Journal.
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and began to develop closer commercial contacts.7 This interest was
initially manifested in increased trade with Eastern Europe.8 For several
reasons, however, including cumbersome domestic restrictions on exports
to Eastern Europe9 and unsatisfactory terms of trade necessitated by East-
ern Europe's lack of hard currency reserves,10 American firms began to
seek more profitable ways of reaching those markets. 1
American firms could in part avoid the handicap of domestic export
restrictions by trading with Eastern Europe through overseas subsidiaries,
a fact which encouraged the proliferation of American-organized multi-
national businesses in the late 1960's.12 They also began to engage in more
sophisticated contractual arrangements in Eastern Europe including,
most prominently, patent licensing and the sale of turnkey plants.'3 Both
7. It has been suggested that, barring any substantial political disturbances in
Eastern Europe, the market for goods there will reach the size of the current
American market by approximately 1980. Benoit, supra note 1, at 39. It has also
been suggested that the potential for growth inherent in the Eastern European
markets, both in terms of trade and investment, surpasses that existing in the Soviet
Union, to which considerably more attention is now being paid. American Direct
Investment, supra note 1, at 883, n.25.
8. An indication of the dimensions of this increase is reflected in United States-
Romanian trade statistics. Between 1964 and 1972, the volume of trade between the
two countries jumped from $6,428,000 to $100,900,000. For annual bilateral trade
statistics between the two countries since 1920, see U.S. DEP'T or COMMERCE, OVERSEAS
Bus. REP. 71-057, at 18, table 20 (Dec. 1971) [hereinafter cited as OBR]; OBR 73-36,
at 21, table 5 (Aug. 1978).
9. For a brief discussion of American export legislation as it applies to Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Hungary, see notes 79-86 infra and accompanying text. For more ex-
tensive discussions of American export legislation as it applies to all of Eastern
Europe, see Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 CoLum. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1978); McQuade, U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and
Parameters, 3 LAw & PoL. INTL' Bus. 42 (1971).
10. See Burgess, Doing Business in Eastern Europe: A Businessman's Look at Romania,
27 Bus. LAw. 491, 505-06 (1972). See also note 14 infra and accompanying text.
11. In this they were spurred by the specter of those markets becoming dominated
by Western European countries, whose economies are generally more complementary
to those of Eastern Europe than is that of the United States and who, for geographical
and historical reasons, are in a better position to carry on extensive commercial
transactions with Eastern Europe. See S. PisAR, CoExisrENCE AND CoIzaEtcE 75-78
(1970); Burgess, supra note 10, at 494-95; Hoya, supra note 9, at 30. See also Pisar,
Coexistence and Commerce with Russia and China: Ground Rules for East-West Trade,
in CuRRENT LAAL ASPECTS OF DOING Businmss wrr SINo-Sovwrx NATIONS 1, 3 (J. Haight
ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as CuRRENT LEGAL AsrEcrs]; American Direct Investment,
supra note 1, at 884.
12. See Hoya, supra note 9, at 8, 9-10. See also Litvak & Maule, The Issues of Direct
Foreign Investments, in FOREIGN INvEm=sNT: TiE EXPERIENCE OF HOST CoUNTRES
8, 13, 19 (I. Litvak & C. Maule eds. 1970). But see American Direct Investment, supra
note 1, at 880 n.14 wherein some restrictions on an American company's ability to
trade through its overseas subsidiaries are discussed.
For a discussion of other benefits to carrying on trade through overseas subsidiaries,
see KRxrscnrAR & FooR, supra note 1, at 57-59.
18. For a discussion of these and other forms of commercial agreements, see sources
collected at note I supra.
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types of operations improved upon trade insofar as American firms could
take their compensation in goods produced under the contract 14 and
the cost of goods thus taken reflected production benefits of Eastern
Europe's cheap labor. But these arrangements did not utilize America's
superior managerial expertise and thereby failed to reap the fullest poten-
tial from Eastern Europe's attractive productive resources.
While American companies tried to develop commercial schemes to
further exploit Eastern European markets, Eastern European countries
were also aware of the benefits that would accrue to expanded East-West
commercial contacts and were eager to entertain American advances.15
It became dear in the late 1950's that the Soviet Union would not be able
to meet the increasing demands of its COMECON partners for capital
goods and technology. 16 Nor could the Soviet Union provide the man-
agerial or marketing expertise needed by Eastern European nations to
achieve the development goals they had set for themselves. As a result,
these countries launched economic reforms directed at making their
economies more attractive to Western businesses interested in the Eastern
European markets.' 7 Foremost among these reforms was the movement to
decentralize the central planning machinery characteristic of the Eastern
European economic systems, thereby making the economies more respon-
sive to market forces and more conducive to interaction with Western
economies.' 8 Also important, though less successful, were the efforts of
these countries to increase hard currency reserves and improve the status
of their own inconvertible currencies. 19
14. American firms could thereby avoid parallel trading arrangements and, more
importantly, payments in inconvertible currency which would then have to be switch-
traded at substantial discounts. For explanations of these practices and the problems
they entail, see Burgess, supra note 10, at 525-26; McQuade, supra note 9, at 58; and
American Direct Investment, supra note 1, at 886 n.38.
15. See American Direct Investment, supra note 1, at 887 nn.40 & 41.
16. Webster & Stowell, supra note 6, at v-vi. See Burgess, supra note 10, at 493.
COMECON, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (also abbreviated CMEA),
was founded in 1949 to promote trade and coordinate national economic plans among
the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. American Direct Investment,
supra note 1, at 884 n.32, 885. See also OBR 71-057, supra note 8, at 14.
17. McQuade, supra note 9, at 57.
18. Typical of the region's efforts in this direction are the numerous reforms
undertaken by Romania in the last decade in an attempt to improve the functioning
of its economy in general and, specifically, its foreign trade sector. For a compre-
hensive discussion of these reforms, see Burgess, Romania Looks West: An Analysis
of Legislative Change in the Foreign Trade Sector During the Sixties, 2 CAL. W. INT'L
.L.J. 16 (1971), and Burgess, supra note 10, at 515-17. For a discussion of similar
developments in Hungary, see Dietz, Foreign Trade Arbitration in Hungary, 5
N.Y.U.J. ILr'r L. & POL. 251, 255-56 (1972).
19. It must be remembered, of course, that all economic reforms in Eastern Europe
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Yugoslavia showed the way to a more fruitful East-West commercial re-
lationship in 1967. Prior to that time, all Eastern European countries had
closely adhered to the socialist doctrine vesting ownership of the means
of production in the state. In July 1967, however, Yugoslavia passed a
law allowing limited foreign equity participation in joint business ven-
tures.20 By providing for joint "ownership," Yugoslavia had found a way
for both East and West to obtain desired ends from increased commer-
cial contacts. An Eastern partner could benefit from Western capital
goods, technology, and managerial and marketing expertise;21 a Western
partner could take advantage of the host country's resources, including
an inexpensive, skilled, and stable labor force, and also have access to the
country's internal lines of product distribution.22 Because of the success
enjoyed by Yugoslavia since its breakthrough in 1967,23 Yugoslav law has
now been substantially imitated by Romania 4 and Hungary.25
have been directed at acquiring hard currency reserves, but the one must logically
precede the other. Thus, to the extent that a country successfully decentralizes its
economy making it more efficient and more attractive to Western investment,
especially in the form of technology, it will begin to develop the means to accumulate
hard currency reserves. The actual accumulation of hard currency, however, riust
await the production of the type of goods that can attract it, which in turn depends
on the ingestion of Western technology. See Burgess, supra note 18, at 18-19. See also
KRErscrAR & Fooa, supra note 1, at 63.
20. The original Yugoslav regulations permitting foreign equity participation ap-
peared in two laws. The first, Law of July 10-11, 1967, Concerning Amending and
Supplementing the Law on Funds of the Business Organizations, [1967] FED. OFFICIAL
GAzm'r oF uma SocAL=Sr FE. RE'. oF YuGosLAVIA No. 31, [hereinafter cited as 1967
Yugoslav Investment Law], cited in Peselj, Yugoslav Laws of Foreign Investment, 2
INT'L LAiw. 499, 502 n.10 (1968), contained the basic provisions regarding foreign invest-
ments. An unofficial translation appears in Am. REv. EAsr-W=sr TRADE, Jan. 1968, at
43-48. The second law, Law of July 10-11, 1967, Concerning the Profit Tax Payable
by the Foreign Persons Who Invest Funds in a Domestic Business Organization for
Joint Business Operations, [1967] FED. OrriciA GAZETTE oF THE SoczAUst Fm. RaE. oF
YuGosLAviA No. 31, [hereinafter cited as 1967 Yugoslav Tax Law], cited in Peselj,
supra, at 502 n.12, regulated the payment of taxes on foreign investors' profits. An
unofficial translation of the law appears in AM. REv. EAsr-WEsr TRADE, Feb. 1968, at
54-57. The investment law has now been superseded by Law of Apr. 12, 1973, Con-
cerning Investment of Resources by Foreign Persons in Domestic Organizations of
Associated Work, [19731 FED. OFFICIAL GAzErrE OF THE SocAUsr Fm. REP. oF
YuosLAvA No. 22, at 742-45 [hereinafter cited as 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law].
21. The Eastern partner might also get access to Western markets through the
functioning of a joint venture. KaRmcmim 8: FooR, supra note 1, at 15-16.
22. The Western partner might also get the benefit of serving even more remote
markets and be able to obtain Eastern European technology in those fields in which
it has outstripped the West. KR rscsmiAr & FooR, supra note 1, at 16-17; Benoit, supra
note I, at 42. See also Webster & Stowell, supra note 6, at viii-ix.
23. Through October 1970 the total capitalization of joint ventures registered in
Yugoslavia was over $239 million. Glickman & Sukijasovic, Yugoslav Worker Manage-
ment and Its Effect on Foreign Investment, 12 Hav. INT'L L.J. 260, 309-11 (1971).
In the ensuing two years, foreign investment alone added roughly another $50 million.
Note, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia: 1971 Amendments to Foreign Investment Laws, 6
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 271, 295 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Ventures in Yugo-
slavia].
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THE EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS
A. A PRELIMINARY COMMENT
The main obstacle to joint ventures in Eastern Europe-the socialist
doctrine regarding state ownership of the means of production-has been
circumvented by the -foreign investment laws of Yugoslavia, Romania,
and Hungary, which confer on foreign investors something approaching
ownership.2 6 These laws have also helped minimize a more pragmatic
obstacle characteristic of commercial transactions with Eastern Europe.
In the absence of explicit regulations, Western negotiators have had to
"hammer out" all details of contracts with their skillful Eastern European
counterparts, an arduous and time-consuming task not always producing
favorable results. 27 The investment laws of these three countries have,
by virtue of their specificity, removed some of the most difficult issues
from the negotiating arena.
28
24. Romania first declared that it would allow limited foreign equity participation
in joint companies in Law No. 1 of March 17, 1971, Concerning the Foreign Trade,
Economic, and Technico-Scientific Cooperative Activities of the Socialist Republic of
Romania, 33 OFFicAL BUL. OF TnE SocIAusr REPUBLic OF RoMANIA (1971) [herein-
after cited as 1971 Romanian Investment Law], cited in Burgess, supra note 10, at 517
n.79, translated in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 161 (1972) and in OBR 71-057, supra note 8,
at app. II. The general terms of the law were implemented more specifically in two
decrees of November 2, 1972; Decree No. 424, On the Constitution, Organization and
Functioning of Mixed Companies [hereinafter cited as 1972 Romanian Investment
Decree], and Decree No. 425, On Taxation of Profits of Mixed Companies [hereinafter
cited as 1972 Romanian Tax Decree]; unofficial translations of these decrees appear
in OFFICIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (Bucharest) (available from the U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Bureau of Int'l Commerce) and in 12 Irr'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 651 (1973).
25. The Hungarian law, Decree of the Minister of Finance, No.: 28/1972 (X.3.) PM,
About the Economic Companies with Foreign Participation, October 3, 1972 [herein -
after cited as 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree], appears in unofficial translation in
the HUNGARIAN GAzEr No. 76, Oct. 3, 1972, and in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 989 (1973).
The decree implements article 31 of Law Decree 19 of the Presidential Council on
Economic Partnerships, August 7, 1970, which by inference had provided for the
foreign equity participation necessary to a joint venture. KIErsCH MAR & FooR, supra
note 1, at 143; Dagon, Cooperation Agreements and Joint Ventures with Socialist
Business Associations: The Hungarian System, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 752, 753 (1973).
26. Although these laws do not provide for "ownership" as that term is usually
understood, they nevertheless allow a foreign investor to hold the "bundle of rights"
comprising the general incidents of ownership, principally the right to assume some
control over an investment and the right to take profits from it. See Benoit, supra
note 1, at 41.
27. For an assessment of what might be involved in negotiating a contract in
Romania, see OBR 73-36, supra note 8, at 10-I1. And for an account of the actual
negotiating experience of an American firm in the Soviet Union-the latter ap-
proaching such negotiations with the same predispositions as do Eastern European
countries generally--see Doolittle, Business Briefs From Moscow Streets: The Practical
Aspects of Trade with the Soviets, in CURRENT LEGAL AsPECTs, supra note 11, at 27,
29-33. See also Burgess, supra note 10, at 521; Webster & Stowell, supra note 6, at ix.
28. For a comprehensive list of provisions generally found in Romanian contracts,
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B. ESSENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES OF AN INvES IvENT DECISION
Before making a firm decision to invest abroad, an American business
will examine a variety of factors concerning the suitability of the poten-
tial host country in an effort to minimize the risks and maximize the
profitability of the proposed investment.29 Central to this investigation is
an evaluation of the legal framework for investment in the host country.
Among the legal issues which the potential investor will seek to clarify,
the following are most important:3 0 (1) what powers of control accrue to
the American investor by virtue of its equity participation; (2) to what
degree and in what form can profits be repatriated; (3) may capital be
similarly repatriated; and (4) what taxes are applicable to business profits.
If the answers to these questions do not appear in a host country's invest-
ment laws, an American investor will seek to determine whether they can
be favorably resolved by contract. However, it is preferable that each of
these essential issues be treated by a host country's investment law. 1
What follows is a comparison of how the Yugoslav, Romanian, and Hun-
garian foreign investment laws treat each of these issues.
1. Powers of Control
The foreign investment laws of all three countries establish the normal
upper limit of a foreign investor's equity participation at forty-nine per-
cent of a joint venture's total capitalization.32 The Yugoslav and Hun-
garian laws additionally provide for greater foreign participation in
see OBR 73-36, supra note 8, at 11-12. For a more general discussion of some of the
important issues that should not be overlooked during negotiations and some ground
rules that should be followed during the negotiating process, see KaxrscHmAR & FooR,
supra note 1, at 68-69, 101-04; Burgess, supra note 10, at 521-2a.
29. Included among such factors are the country's general political and economic
stability; its industrial, communications, and transportation infrastructures; its natural
resource endowment and labor conditions; and the size of its domestic market. Also
of great importance is the country's record in meeting its obligations in international
commercial transactions. And the potential investor will, if possible, look closely at the
situation of other current foreign investors in the country. American Direct Investment,
supra note 1, at 895.
30. A number of lesser factors which may be considered in making an investment
decision are discussed briefly in Litvak 8: Maule, supra note 12, at 18-21.
81. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
82. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 4, para. 1, [1978] Fan. OFFICIAL GAzEar oF
Ma SOcALMsT FED. RaE,. oF YuGosLAviA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20; 1972 Romanian
Investment Decree, art. 4, OrFIcIAL BuLL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial transl.),
supra note 24; 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 4, HUNGARIAN GAZuT= No.
76, Oct. 3, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25. See also 1971 Romanian Investment
Law, art. 59, para. 1, 38 OrICIAL BuLL. op Ta SOCALIST REPuBLmc oF ROMAmA (1971),
supra note 24.
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exceptional circumstances, 88 though in a Yugoslav venture,84 and pre-
sumably in a Hungarian one also, a foreign investor may never possess
effective majority control despite a majority equity position.
There is some difference among the laws as to the ownership of foreign
assets 85 contributed to a joint venture. Romanian law is dearest on the
point, providing that a foreign investor does not continue to own invested
assets in a private capacity.8 6 It was formerly assumed that this principle
also applied under Yugoslav law,87 a reasonable assumption in light of
the fundamental Yugoslav constitutional principle of social ownership
of property. Nevertheless, the present Yugoslav investment law provides
that a foreign investor may retain title to specific contributed assets,88
and practice has sustained the law. 9 The Hungarian law does not address
the question of ownership of contributed assets, and, as yet, practice has
not indicated which of these positions will be adopted.
Though differences exist concerning the ability of a foreign investor
to retain control over its contributed assets via continued ownership, the
laws of all three nations sanction shared management control. The
Hungarian law, again less specific than the Yugoslav and Romanian laws,
appears to leave the relationship of venture partners to be worked out
entirely in the partnership contract,40 except insofar as the particular
33. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law provides that if the
Federal Assembly determines that special circumstances in a particular economic activity
are present, a foreign investor's equity share in a joint venture might exceed forty-nine
percent. Article 4 of the 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree provides: "The foreign
partners share of the partnership funds [basic capital, etc.] generally should not exceed
49 percent" (emphasis added).
34. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 5, [1973] FED. OFFICi.L GAZETrE OF THE
SocIAL=sr FEn. REP. OF YUGOSLAVIA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20.
35. Article 14, paragraph 1 of the 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, supra note 24,
enumerates several broad categories of forms which a foreign investor's capital
contribution can take. In more specific terms these include money, machinery, raw
materials, patents and licenses, and technological and managerial know-how. Neither
of the other laws specifies any particular kind of property that iust be invested.
In the case of Yugoslav law, this silence has been interpreted to mean that any of
the above forms could be invested. Peselj, supra note 20, at 505; Sukijasovic, Legal
Aspects of Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia, 37 LAw & CoNrmIP. PROD. 474, 478
(1972). Since these Eastern European countries most desire non-financial assets from
the West (see note 21 supra and accompanying text), it may be assumed that
Hungary will also accept other than financial contributions.
86. 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, art. 12, OFFiciAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4,
1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24.
37. Peselj, supra note 20, at 506.
38. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 10, [1973] FEn. OmcIAL GAZETTE OF THE
SocuAL.ir FED. RE'. OF YUGOSLAVIA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20.
39. Sukijasovic, supra note 35, at 480-81. For a discussion of the constitutional
problem posed by article 10, see Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia, supra note 23, at
271, 284-87.
40. The law does not state this in so many words as do the Yugoslav and Romanian
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form of business enterprise chosen is governed by other business statutes.4 1
While the Yugoslav and Romanian laws also leave the precise scope of
powers which may be asserted by a foreign investor to the terms of the
investment contract and related documents,4 they clarify the manner in
which power is to be shared with the domestic enterprise's self-manage-
ment organ.43
2. Repatriation of Profits
The Yugoslav and Romanian investment laws provide that the manner
in which the partners share profits derived from a joint venture may be
fixed by contract.44 The Hungarian law is again less informative than
Yugoslav and Romanian law, but in the absence of an express regula-
tion, it may be assumed that, as with the laws of the other two nations,
the mode of profit-sharing will be established in the partnership contract.
The laws of all three countries guarantee the foreign investor's right
to repatriate its share of the profits generated by the joint enterprise 45
laws, but the constant references to the broad powers arising under the partnership
contract which appear throughout the law suggest this conclusion. See 1972 Hungarian
Investment Decree, arts. 3(1), 5, 6(2), 8, 11(l)-(4), 12(5), HUNGARIAN GAZETTE No. 76,
Oct. 3, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25.
41. Id. art. 14(2).
42. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 9, [1973] FED. OFCAL GAzErrE OF THE
SoCIALt FED. REP. OF YuGosLAvu No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20; 1972 Romanian
Investment Decree, art. 11, OFFICIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial transl.),
supra note 24. See also 1971 Romanian Investment Law, art. 58, par. 2, 33 OFFICiAL
BULL. OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF RoMtrANI (1971), supra note 24.
43. Under Yugoslav law, whatever management control a foreign investor retains
over its contributed assets is manifested through its membership in a "joint business
board" (or "joint operation board'). 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 9, [1973]
FED. OFFIciAL GAzEIrE OF THE SOCIALsT FED. REP. OF YUGOSLAVIA No. 22, at 742-45,
supra note 20. While the board's powers are broad, they are subject to being over-
ridden in certain policy matters by the "workers' council" of the particular economic
organization, the primary organ of worker self-management in Yugoslavia. For a
discussion of this management arrangement, see Glickman & Sukijasovic, supra note 23,
at 260, 267-71, 293-99. See also Peselj, supra note 20, at 508-11.
Under Romanian law a foreign investor also shares management committee responsi-
bilities with representatives of the domestic enterprise's self-management organization,
the "working peoples' general assembly." 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, art. 34,
par. 2, OFmCiAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24.
Additionally, article 33, paragraph 2, enables foreign personnel to undertake actual
managing functions.
44. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 7, [1973] FED. OFFICmL GAzErrE oF THE
SOCIALIST FED. REP. OF YuGosLA iA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20; 1972 Romanian
Investment Decree, art. 10, para. 2, OFIcIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial
transl.), supra note 24. See also 1971 Romanian Investment Law, art. 58, par. 2, 33
OFFICIAL BULL. OF THE SOCIALIST R.EPUBLIC OF ROMANIA (1971), supra note 24.
45. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 18, par. 1, [1973] Fa. OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
THE SoCIALIST Fan. REP. oF YuGOsLAviA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20; 1972 Romanian
Investment Decree, art. 7, OFrIcA. BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial transl.),
supra note 24; 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 11(1), HUNGARALN GAzErrE
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after payment of profit taxes.4 6 However, in addition to profit taxes, each
country imposes additional financial liabilities on a joint venture's profits
before a foreign investor can transfer its share abroad. Yugoslav law,
formerly the most restrictive concerning disposition of a foreigner's
profits, 47 has been amended and now may be the most favorable regarding
repatriation of profits. Beside profit taxes, only an annual payment of
an unspecified amount to the "social community" diminishes a foreigner's
profits.4 s In Romania a foreign investor must contribute additionally up
to five percent of annual profits to a "reserve fund" until the fund reaches
twenty-five percent of the foreigner's capital investment.49 Under Hun-
garian law there are two special assessments which further limit a foreign
investor's ability to repatriate its earnings. The first resembles the "re-
serve fund" provision of Romanian law. By its terms, the foreigner must
contribute together with the Hungarian partner to a "risk fund" in a
manner determined by the partnership contract until the fund consti-
tutes one-tenth of the joint venture's value.50 The other special assessment
provides that an "employees' profit-sharing fund," not to exceed fifteen
percent of the annual wages, may be established jointly by the partners
from the enterprise's annual profits.51
A foreign investor is concerned not only with its ability to repatriate
No. 76, Oct. 3, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25. See also 1971 Romanian Invest-
ment Law, art. 60, para. 2, 33 OFICIAL BULL. OF THE SocruFS REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA
(1971), supra note 24.
46. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 17, [1973] FED. OF'xcrLr GAzErrE OF THE
SorALusr FEm. RxP. OF YUGosLAViA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20; 1972 Romanian
Investment Decree, art. 7, OFFCIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial trans].),
supra note 24; 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 7(l), HUNGARIAN GAZErrE No.
76, Oct. 3, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25. See also 1971 Romanian Investment
Law, art. 60, para. 2, 33 OFnIAL BULL. OF THE SoCIALIsT REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA (1971),
supra note 24.
47. Article 640, paragraph 4 of the 1967 Yugoslav Investment Law, supra note 20,
mandated that a foreigner reinvest at least twenty percent of its net profits in the
Yugoslav economy, but the provision was repealed in 1971. See Joint Ventures in
Yugoslavia, supra note 23, at 282-84. Article 18, paragraph 3, of the 1973 Yugoslav
Investment Law, supra note 20, provides only that a foreigner may reinvest its
earnings in the Yugoslav economy.
48. The 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, supra note 20, contains an oblique reference
to the payment to the "social community" in article 20, paragraph 2. For a breakdown
of this payment for the "needs of society," see Glickman & Sukijasovic, supra note 23,
at 262 n.18.
49. 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, art. 26, para. 1, OFICIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov.
4, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24; 1972 Romanian Tax Decree, art. 2, para. 3,
OFFIcL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24.
50. 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 5, HUNGARIAN GAzErE No. 76 (unofficial
transl.), supra note 25.
51. Id. art. 6(1). Despite its optional appearance, this provision is likely to be
routinely written into investment contracts since the Hungarian partner will want
domestic laborers to share in a joint venture's prosperity.
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profits, but also with the form in which they may be repatriated. Roma-
nian law appears to enable a foreign investor to establish by contract that
all cash profits be transferable in convertible currencies.52 This benefit is
stated more clearly in the Hungarian law, but is subject to the further
stipulation that a foreign investor's profits may be repatriated only to
the degree that they are deposited in the Hungarian National Bank.
53
The Yugoslav law provides no guarantees that accrued profits may be
taken in freely convertible currencies. The degree to which profits may
be so transferred depends entirely on the degree to which a joint ven-
ture's earnings are in hard currencies.54
3. Repatriation of Capital
The foreign investment laws of all three countries permit the repatri-
ation of a foreign investor's capital contribution, though on somewhat
differing terms. Romanian law guarantees repatriation upon the dis-
solution or liquidation of a joint enterprise,55 leaving the circumstances
under which dissolution or liquidation would occur to contract negoti-
ations.5 6 The laws of Yugoslavia and Hungary address the conditions for
repatriation more specifically. Under Yugoslav law, a foreign investor
may withdraw its residual capital investment when the contract has
terminated by virtue of the achievement of its objectives 57 or when it has
been cancelled either for failure to reach economic expectations or for
breach.58 The Hungarian law limits repatriation of a foreign partner's
52. See 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, arts. 23 & 24, OFFICIAL BULL. No. 121,
Nov. 4, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24. See also KRECHMAR 9- FOoR, supra
note 1, at 117.
53. 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 11(1), HUNGARIAN GAzE No. '76, Oct. 3,
1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25.
54. Peselj, supra note 20, at 512. See Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia, supra note 23, at
281. It should be remembered, however, that this problem can generally be avoided to
the extent that the foreign investor has negotiated within the broad contractual
powers granted it to take its profits in the form of the joint venture's production. See
note 14 supra and accompanying text.
55. 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, art. 7, OFFICIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972
(unofficial transl.), supra note 24. See also 1971 Romanian Investment Law, art. 60,
para. 2, 33 OFFICIAL BULL. OF THE SocIALsr REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA (1971), supra note 24.
56. 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, art. 36, OFFICIAL BULL. No. 121, Nov. 4,
1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24. See also 1971 Romanian Investment Law, art.
58, para. 2, 33 OFFICIAL BULL. OF T E SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA (1971), supra
note 24. While it is not clear how much leverage a potential foreign investor has in
this regard, it is at least dear that the investment laws envisage the possible repatria-
tion of capital by foreign partners to joint ventures.
57. 1973 Yugoslav Investment Law, art. 19, para. 1, [1973] FED. OFIIciAL GAZETrE OF
THE SOCIALsr FED. REP. OF YUGOsLAvIA No. 22, at 742-45, supra note 20.
58. Id. art. 11, para. 2. A further provision of the law also enables a foreign investor
to transfer its rights and obligations under the investment contract to another foreign
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investment to the amount of its capital contribution on deposit in the
Hungarian National Bank should the foreigner unilaterally withdraw
from the venture.59 But if complete liquidation of the enterprise occurs,00
the foreign partner may transfer its entire interest abroad after the ven-
ture's existing debts have been satisfied6 1 In either situation, the re-
patriation of capital is accomplished in the currency set by the contract.
The Hungarian law also has a unique provision which guarantees the
foreign investor compensation to the extent of its initial capital contribu-
tion for damages caused by state measures.62
4. Taxes63
Under Yugoslav and Romanian law, the tax schemes to which a foreign
investor's share of venture profits are subjected do not appear to vary
to any substantial degree, though tax benefits offered by Yugoslavia are
greater. The Hungarian scheme varies considerably from the other two
and does not appear as favorable, though circumstances are conceivable
in which it would be no less favorable.
The basic Yugoslav tax rate of thirty-five percent is levied uniformly
on all net profits, no matter how large.64 However, to encourage reinvest-
ment in the Yugoslav economy, a foreign investor is offered substantial
incremental tax benefits, reducing the tax rate up to fifty percent should
the foreigner reinvest one-quarter or more of net earnings.65 Romanian
or domestic business organization, thereby terminating the investment relationship.
Id. art. 15. See also id. art. 16.
59. 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 11(4), HUNGArIANR GAzET No. 76, Oct. 3,
1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25.
60. A complete liquidation may occur either as agreed upon in the partnership
contract, id. art. 12(5), or upon determination by the Hungarian Minister of Finance
that a venture is insolvent. Id. arts. 12(2)-(3).
61. Id. art. 13.
62. Id. art. 11(2).
63. This section will discuss only business taxes. Personal income taxes on foreign
employees are not treated by the investment laws of the three countries.
64. 1967 Yugoslav Tax Law, art. 4, [1967] FED. Ormcut. GA Z-rE or THE SocuLisr
FED. REP. OF YUGosLAvA No. 31, supra note 20.
65. Id. art. 5, paras. 1-3:
If a foreign person uses at least 25 percent of the profit earned in a
year for increasing his share in the funds of the joint business operations,
or invests it in another domestic business organization . . . or deposits
it with a bank in Yugoslavia, that part of the assessed tax arising from
that part of the profit shall be reduced by 15 percent.
If a foreign person uses over 25 percent to 50 percent of the earned
profit of the purposes stated in Paragraph 1, of this Article, the assessed tax
arising from 25 percent of the profit shall be reduced by 15 percent, and
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law similarly assesses a flat rate of thirty percentO against profits less the
annual contribution to the "reserve fund."67 As with Yugoslav law, this
basic rate will be adjusted according to what a foreign investor does with
its profits. The tax is reduced by twenty percent on any portion rein-
vested in Romania for a minimum period of five years.08 Furthermore,
special tax benefits are realized in the first three profitable years of a
venture's operation. 9 The Hungarian law provides a two-tiered tax
schedule, 70 levied on a joint venture's annual profits less contributions to
the "risk" and "profit-sharing" funds.71 By its terms, if annual profits do
not exceed twenty percent of total fixed value, they are taxed at a uni-
form rate of forty percent; but if profits surpass twenty percent, the rate
jumps to sixty percent on the excess amount. A foreign partner may
realize some compensating tax benefits by reinvesting profits in the joint
venture,72 as with the laws of the other two countries. But the Hungarian
law does not state the extent of such benefits, which presumably falls
within the discretion of the Minister of Finance. Although no further
tax liabilities exist in Yugoslavia, both Hungary73 and Romania74 require
contributions from the joint enterprise for social insurance. Additionally,
net earnings repatriated from Romania are subject to a tax surcharge of
ten percent.75
that tax arising from that part of the profit above 25 percent shall be re-
duced by 30 percent.
If a foreign person uses over 50 percent of the earned profit for the
purposes stated in Paragraph 1 . .. besides the tax facilities referred to in
paragraph 2, of this article, the assessed tax on that part of the profit above
50 percent shall be reduced by 50 percent.
Besides receiving the benefits of the national law on tax remission, a foreign investor
may realize additional tax benefifs from Yugoslavia's underdeveloped republics and
autonomous provinces which are authorized to apply their own tax reduction regula-
tions to foreign investment in their territories. Sukijasovic, supra note 35, at 481-82.
66. 1972 Romanian Tax Decree, art. 1, OrriciAL BuLL. No. 121, Nov. 4, 1972 (unof-
ficial transl.), supra note 24.
67. Id. art. 2, para. 2.
68. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
69. Id. art. 3.
70. 1972 Hungarian Investment Decree, art. 7(3), HUNGAAN GAznr No. 76,
Oct. 3, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 25.
71. Id. art. 7(2).
72. Id. art. 7(4).
73. The Hungarian law also requires that a contribution be made to retirement
pension funds. Id. art. 9(2).
74. 1972 Romanian Investment Decree, art. 35, para. 1, OrFMCUL Buur. No. 121, Nov.
4, 1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24.
75. 1972 Romanian Tax Decree, art. 13, para. 1, OFciAL BuLL. No. 121, Nov. 4,
1972 (unofficial transl.), supra note 24.
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M
A FURTHER LEGAL CONSIDERATION:
AMERICAN LEGISLATION AFFECTING INVESTMENT ABROAD
Because United States legislation regulating American business trans-
actions abroad continues to treat commercial relations with Yugoslavia
more favorably than those with Romania or Hungary,78 American
business firms seeking joint ventures in Eastern Europe may look to
Yugoslavia first, though, as the foregoing comparison reveals, its foreign
investment law has no compelling advantages over those of Romania and
Hungary. This is so despite the concern which the United States has
shown in the recent past for developing closer ties with Romania and,
to a lesser degree, Hungary.
77
Since the recent termination of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Regulations, 78 the principal United States legislation treating commercial
76. This situation is no doubt superficially attributable to Yugoslavia's long-standing
independence in Eastern Europe, but it also reflects a more deeply-seated and
disturbing Congressional inability to bury its Cold War anxieties and keep pace with
the changing political complexion of Eastern Europe. For a brief history of Executive
efforts to liberalize commercial relations with all of Eastern Europe, see S. PIsAR, supra
note 11, at 79-93. See also Burgess, supra note 10, at 495-96.
77. One measure of the enthusiasm the United States has shown for developing
closer ties with Romania is the number of high level visits to Romania made by
U.S. officials. OBR 73-36, supra note 8, at 2. See also Burgess, supra note 10, at 497,
510. On improving United States-Hungarian relations, see the N.Y. Times, May 20,
1973, at 13, col. 1.
78. Because of considerable improvement in the United States' balance-of-payments
position in the past year [see CCH BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS REP. J 9150, 9159, 9165,
9175 (1973)], the FDI Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101-1407 (1973), were terminated
January 29, 1974 [see N.Y. Times, Jan. 80, 1974, at 1, col. 51, well in advance of the
Nixon Administration's intended December 31, 1974 deadline for phasing out the
investment controls. Statement on Devaluation of the Dollar by Treasury Secretary
Shultz, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1978, at 56, col. 5.
While they were in operation, the FDI Regulations were foremost among United
States commercial laws treating Yugoslavia more favorably than Romania or Hungary.
Under the regulations' tripartite scheme, Yugoslavia was grouped with those less
developed countries to which American investment was still encouraged. 15 C.F.R.
§ 1000.319(a) (1973). Romania and Hungary, however, were included in the most
sharply restricted investment category. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.319(c) (1978). The adverse effect
of this classification on the latter countries was two-fold. Besides the fact that an
American business' annual direct investment "allowable" within their category was
substantially less than it was within Yugoslavia's category (15 C.F.R.. §§ 1000.502-.507
(1978)], Romania and Hungary suffered the additional handicap of having to compete
for American investment with the developed countries of Western Europe, all of
which, with the sole exception of the United Kingdom [15 C.F.R. § 1000.319(b) (1978)],
fell into their classification. Though the effects of the FDI Regulations could be
avoided by several routes, notably if the value of the assets invested abroad was
less than $50,000 or the investment itself of less than twelve months duration [15 C.F.R.
§ 1000.304(d) (1978)], none offered a realistic alternative to most American businesses.
The result was that while the regulations were in operation, they tended to
discourage American investment in Romania or Hungary.
For an excellent discussion of the FDI Regulations as they formerly applied to
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intercourse with Eastern Europe are the regulations79 authorized by the
Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended by the Equal Export
Opportunity Act of 1972.80 These regulations restrict the type of capital
goods and technology which may be exported to or eventually reexported
from a joint venture host country,' and like the former FD1 Regulations,
they continue to accord Yugoslavia a favored treatment.
Under the export regulations, Yugoslavia is classified with the developed
countries of the West and is afforded the same liberal export treatment
they enjoy.8 2 Romania receives treatment which is less restrictive than
Hungary and the remaining countries of Eastern Europe,3 but which is
still not as liberal as that received by Yugoslavia.8 4 For practical purposes,
this difference in treatment may not be especially important. The capital
goods and technology which an American business would consider contrib-
uting as its share of a joint venture in Yugoslavia, Romania, or Hungary
would, in all likelihood, not be of a nature that would be denied export
licenses to any of the countries except in the rarest of circumstances.8 5
joint ventures in Eastern Europe, see Hoya, The Office of Foreign Direct Investments
and East-West Joint Ventures, Am. REv. EAr-Wmrr TRADE, Aug./Sept. 1971, at 16.
For a more extensive analysis of the regulations as they operated generally, see Mc-
Dermott, The Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARv. INr'L L.J. 490 (1970).
79. The basic export controls are implemented by the Export Control Regulations,
15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1973). For additional export controls pertaining to a variety of
special goods, see Hoya, supra note 9, at 6 n.30.
80. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-13 (Supp. 1973).
81. The regulations are authorized to control exports pursuant to three legislative
objectives: (I) to protect the domestic economy against supply shortages and the
inflationary impact of excessive foreign demand; (2) to further American foreign
policy and fulfill America's international responsibilities; and (3) to protect national
security. 15 C.F.R. § 370.1(a) (1973). The national security purpose has, until recently,
been the principal concern in the issuance of export licenses, especially for goods to
be exported to communist countries. Hoya, supra note 9, at 7. However, political
turmoil over shortages of an ever-growing number of commodities suggests that the
short-supply rationale will be increasingly relied upon.
82. 15 C.F.R. § 585.4(c) (1973). Exports to this group of nations are generally
restricted only to the degree necessary to prevent their being reexported or diverted
to unauthorized destinations contrary to the United States national interest. 15 C.F.R.
§ 385.4(b) (1973).
83. Burgess, supra note 10, at 509-10. See 15 C.F.R. § 370 Supp. No. 1 (1973).
84. Compare 15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1973) with 15 C.F.R. § 885.4(b) (1973).
85. Although many types of goods and technical data may now be exported to
Romania and, to a lesser degree, Hungary without formal government approval
under a "General License," goods or data that may have strategic value to these
communist countries can be exported only under a "Validated License," if in fact
they can be exported to them at all. Hoya, supra note 9, at 7-8. In determining whether
such items can be exported to these countries, the government, considers inter alia:
the kinds and quantities of commodities or technologies to be shipped,
their military and civilian uses, the availability abroad of the same or compar-
able items, the country of destination, the ultimate end-user in the country
of destination, and the intended end-use.
15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1973).
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But the potential that Yugoslavia could receive more favorable treatment
exists and is reflected daily in the fact that applications to export goods
or technology to Yugoslavia under Validated Licenses are processed with
less delay s6
American businesses planning to invest in Eastern Europe must also
consider legislation pertaining to the Export-Import Bank87 and the Over-
seas Private Investors Corporation (OPIC),88 the benefits of which now
apply equally to Yugoslavia and Romania. The former legislation is
important only if an American firm seeks government financing for its
investment;89 the latter, however, provides insurance and *other invest-
ment guarantees important to all American overseas investors,0 0 and the
inability to purchase such protection will no doubt discourage businesses
which might otherwise consider investment in Hungary.
CONCLUSION
From a purely legal point of view, there are but slight grounds upon
which to distinguish among the investment laws of Yugoslavia, Romania,
and Hungary in an attempt to determine which is most favorable. Each
of the laws presents an investor with certain advantages that do not ap-
pear-or at least do not appear as dearly-under the other two laws.
Each also contains certain weaknesses not appearing in the others. In the
abstract, it is impossible to weigh these relative benefits and burdens with
any precision. But, on balance, if any one of the laws does seem to be
more favorable to foreign investors, it is the Yugoslav law. This is so,
however, as much for the fact that the Yugoslav law has had the benefit
of substantial experience in its application as for any compelling ad-
vantages that inhere in it.
86. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 370.11(a)(4) & (b)(2) (1973). See also Burgess, supra note 10,
at 500-05 for a discussion of the practical problems involved in exporting goods to
Romania.
87. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1970). Export-Import Bank financing of exports to Yugoslavia
and Romania was authorized by Presidential determination in 1968 and 1971 respec-
tively. Hoya, supra note 9, at 12 & nn.51 & 52.
88. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a (1970). OPIC guarantees were extended to investments
in Yugoslavia and Romania by Presidential action in 1972. Hoya, supra note 9, at 18.
89. Although the availability of Export-Import Bank credits is important in
normal export trade with Eastern Europe since most transactions are based upon the
extension of credit to the foreign buyer, an American investor in a joint venture
will generally not be exporting goods for sale to the foreign enterprise, so that
financing of this nature will usually be unnecessary.
90. OPIC provides American investors abroad with insurance against expropriation,
currency inconvertibility, and war damage. It also guarantees private loans made to
these investors by American lending institutions. Hoya, supra note 9, at 18.
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Whatever the relative merits of the three investment laws, this much
can be stated with certainty: the investment laws adopted by Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Hungary hold great potential for American businesses and
even greater potential for American foreign policy. Investors are now
offered opportunities to enter into more involved commercial relation-
ships and to enjoy more substantial production benefits and possibilities
for market expansion than were ever before possible. If such involvement
occurs and is mutually beneficial, other Eastern European countries will
be encouraged to enact similar laws. The interaction that must inevitably
attend such developments will contribute to improved relations between
Eastern Europe and the United States at economic, social, and political
levels alike.
Despite the potential existing in these investment laws, however, the
fact must not be overlooked that the older, less involved and less profit-
able forms of commercial endeavor still continue to be relied upon more
than joint ventures.9 ' This may be attributable to the relative infancy of
all three laws and to the fact that American businesses have yet to acquire
the confidence in Eastern European investment that will come with
greater exposure. Nevertheless, the opportunities offered by the laws of
Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary will not be fully realized until the
United States adjusts its commercial legislation to meet current political
realities in Eastern Europe. The termination of the foreign investment
controls92 is a first step in this direction, but it alone is not enough. Con-
gress is now in the process of easing trade restrictions with the socialist
states of Eastern Europe by offering them the benefit of most-favored-
nation status with regard to United States trade concessions. 93 Congress
should not stop there, but should press on and also take affirmative action
to encourage American investment in Eastern Europe.
Michael George Pfeifer
91. See Webster & Stowell, supra note 6, at vii, x. See also Pisar, supra note 11, at 4.
92. See note 78 supra.
93. See the Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), at
§§ 401-07, now pending before Congress.
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